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RECENT DECISIONS
den of proof is on the defendant to establish his insanity by a
preponderance of evidence.12 With this fact in view, it should be
noted that the second witness, who testified to the sanity of the de-
fendant, was the defendant's expert witness and that said witness
testified as to the mental condition of the accused on the date of the
crime. Thus, taking cognizance of the rule of burden of proof of
that jurisdiction and the conflicting testimony of the defendant's own
witnesses, the court does not appear to have erred in holding that the
defendant had not, as a matter of law, sustained the burden of proof
imposed upon him. The striking of the testimony of the first witness
was the equivalent of such a holding.
However, the striking of the testimony in the instant case would
constitute error in New York. In this jurisdiction the people must
prove the sanity of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt once
the defendant has put his sanity in issue.13 The stricken testimony
would have been sufficient to compel the prosecution to come for-
ward and prove the sanity of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt and would have raised an issue for the determination of the
jury.
C. F. McG.
CRIMINAL LAw-VOLUNTARY CONFESSION-INTOXICATION -
VALIDITY-QUESTION OF FACT FOR JURY OR CoURT.-The prosecu-
tion obtained a conviction of manslaughter by using a confession
made by the defendant while intoxicated. The defendant appealed
on the ground that he was intoxicated to the point of mania I when
he made the confession and that, therefore, it was not freely and
voluntarily made as required by law.2  He also pleaded that it was
error for the trial judge to decide as a question of fact that the con-
fession was admissible and to allow the jury to weigh only the value
of the confession. Held, conviction sustained. Intoxication, at the
time a confession is made, unless it goes to the extent of mania, does
not affect its admissibility into evidence if it was otherwise voluntary.
Whether the confession was free and voluntary is a question for the
judge to decide. State v. Alexander, - La. -, 40 So. 2d 232
(1949).
12 State v. Molnar, 133 N. J. L. 327, 44 A. 2d 197 (1945) ; State v. George,
supra note 6; State v. Overton, 85 N. J. L. 287, 88 Atl. 689 (1913) ; State v.
Maioni, 78 N. J. L. 339, 74 Atl. 526 (1909).
13 People v. Tobin, 176 N. Y. 278, 68 N. E. 359 (1903) ; People v. Egnor,
175 N. Y. 419, 67 N. E. 906 (1903) ; O'Connell v. People, 87 N. Y. 377 (1882)
(construing N. Y. PzNa.A LAW § 815).
1 "Mania a potu. Delirium tremens, or a species of temporary insanity
resulting as a secondary effect produced by the excessive and protracted in-
dulgence in intoxicating liquors." BLACK, LAW DicTIoNARY (3d ed. 1933).
2 State v. Berry, 50 La. Ann. 1309, 24 So. 329 (1898).
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In the instant case, the trial judge was sufficiently convinced
that the confession was free and voluntary even though made while
defendant was intoxicated. In Louisiana the voluntariness of such
a confession is to be determined by the trial judge, and his ruling
will be upheld by an appellate court unless clearly erroneous. 3 Al-
though the confession is admitted into evidence, the jury may dis-
credit its value in whole or in part if they feel it proper to do so.4
Courts take the position that a person is rational until the point of
mania is reached; and that a valid confession by an intoxicated per-
son may be made up to that time.5 This seems to be the prevailing
rule in the United States.6
There are two distinct views as to who shall determine whether
or not a confession is voluntary. The majority of states hold that
this determination is ultimately for the jury, while the minority hold
that the trial judge shall determine the validity of such evidence.7
Some states have utilized both rules allowing the circumstances sur-
rounding each particular case to determine whether the majority or
minority view will prevail in any given instance.8 The federal courts
have followed this procedure; but they have recently evidenced a
tendency towards the majority view.9 That it is a question for the
jury when there is conflict, is definitely established in New York.10
The jury should be permitted to determine whether the confession is
voluntary only where a question of fact is presented. 1 If there is
no conflict, and it is clearly evident that the confession was not
voluntary, the judge should exclude it from the evidence. 12
Similar instances arise when the confession is obtained while the
person is under the influence of drugs. The New York courts have
held that a confession of this character is generally admissible; how-
ever, the fact that it was procured while the individual was under
the influence of drugs is to be weighed by the jury.13 An interesting
problem arises when a confession is procured after administering
scopamoline, a truth serum, to the defendant. As yet the validity of
such a confession has not been passed upon by the courts. However,
it would seem that when the question does arise, the courts will apply
the same rule followed in connection with the use of any other drug.
Confessions extorted by hypnosis present another undecided
3 State v. Porteau, 52 La. Ann. 416, 26 So. 993 (1889).
4 State v. Hogan, 117 La. 863, 42 So. 352 (1906).
5 Bell v. United States, 47 F. 2d 438 (C. A. D. C. 1931).
6 See Note, 74 A. L. R. 1102 (1931).
7 See Note, 85 A. L. R. 870 (1933).
s Ibid.
9 Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613 (1896).
10 People v. Brasch, 193 N. Y. 46, 85 N. E. 809 (1909).
11 People v. Rogers, 192 N. Y. 331, 81 N. E. 135 (1908); People v. Brasch,
supra note 11.
12 People v. Barbato, 254 N. Y. 170, 172 N. E. 458 (1930); People v.
Weiner, 248 N. Y. 118, 161 N. E. 441 (1928).
13 People v. Kent, 41 Misc. 191, 83 N. Y. Supp. 948 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
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question. Since the subject when hypnotized, is under the influence
and will of another, he is not master of his own will and is subject
to hallucinations which may be suggested by the hypnotist. The
validity of such a confession is very questionable.
A confession, extorted from a prisoner in custody through force
or fear, is invalid and must be rejected by the court.1 4 This is also
true where, as an inducement for obtaining a confession, the district
attorney promises the accused freedom from prosecution.15
From the foregoing it can readily be seen that the initial problem
is the determination of whether or not the confession is voluntary.
Some states have adopted the rule that this question is to be decided
by the trial judge, while the majority hold that it falls within the
province of the jury. Since the issue is in reality a question of fact,
it would appear that the majority view is the better one.
T. W. S.
EQUITY - REFORMATION OF DEEDs - MUTUAL MISTAKE OF
FAcT.-The plaintiffs' agents effected a contract of sale for the larger
of two lots owned by the plaintiffs in Tennessee. The secretary of
the plaintiffs' lawyer was instructed by the lawyer to make out the
required deed. Through inadvertence she incorporated the descrip-
tion of both of the lots owned by the plaintiffs, whereas the contract
concerned only the larger. The deed in this form was executed by
the plaintiffs and delivered to the grantee who subsequently trans-
ferred the deed to the defendant herein. When the error was dis-
covered the plaintiffs promptly instituted this suit praying for a decree
divesting defendant of title to the lot erroneously conveyed and re-
vesting title in the plaintiffs. The Chancellor granted the petition
by way of reformation of the deed on the ground of mutual mistake
of fact. Held, affirmed. One of the fountainheads of equitable jur-
isdiction is the reformation of instruments which have been errone-
ously constructed due to a mutual mistake as to some extrinsic fact.
When there is a mistake of fact so fundamental that the minds of
the parties have not met, or where unconscionable advantage has been
gained through mistake, equity will act to protect legal rights and
prevent intolerable injustice provided that the plaintiff has not been
guilty either of gross negligence in effecting the mistake, or of sleep-
ing on his rights, and provided that restitution to status quo is
feasible without interference with intervening rights. Alston v.
Porter, - Tenn. -, 219 S. W. 2d 445 (1949).
24 People v. Barbato, supra note 13.
L5 N. Y. CODF CRIM. PROC. § 395; People v. Reilly, 224 N. Y. 90, 120 N. E.
113 (1918).
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